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Abstract 
Recently the medical profession has faced increasing outside pressure to reform 
postgraduate medical training programs to better equip young doctors for changing 
health care needs and public expectations. In this paper, we explore the impact of 
reform on professional self-governance by conducting a comparative historical-
institutional analysis of postgraduate medical training reform in Britain and the 
Netherlands. In both countries, the medical training regime has shifted from 
professional self-regulation to co-regulation. Yet, there are notable differences in 
each country that cannot be solely explained by diverging institutional contexts. They 
also result from the strategic actions by the actors involved. Based on an assessment 
of the recent literature on institutional transformation, this paper shows how strategic 
actions set negotiating authority processes into motion, producing new and 
sometimes surprising institutional arrangements that can have profound effects on 
the distribution and allocation of authority in the medical training regime. The paper 
stresses the need to study the interactions between political context, the properties of 
institutions and negotiating authority processes, as they are crucially important to 
understanding institutional transformation. 
 
1. Introduction 
As a professional group par excellence, the medical profession is often described in 
terms of its authority and capacity to govern its own members (e.g. Larson 1977, 
Freidson 2001). In the governance regime of medical professionals, professional 
training is considered a core institution, regulating both entry to the profession as well 
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as the transfer of professional skills and habits. Despite considerable changes in 
health care policy regimes in the 20th century, this core attribute of the professional 
medical community has remained largely uncontested. In the past decade, however, 
the medical profession has faced increasing outside pressure to reform training 
programs to improve patient safety and better equip young doctors for changing 
health care needs and public expectations (Ludmerer and Johns 2005; Drazen and 
Epstein 2002). To that end, medical associations in various Western countries (e.g. 
USA, Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands) have launched new vocational programs 
to meet revised standards in residency training, lifestyle, and preparation for 
supervisory roles (Ringsted et al. 2006: 437; Drolet et al. 2010; Fitzgibbons et al. 
2006). Traditional apprenticeship-based programs, where residents gradually learn 
the skills and professional values of their specialty are being replaced by more 
structured and transparent training based on modern educational insights 
(Wallenburg et al. 2010).  
 A growing body of sociological and medical educational literature has 
discussed these reforms in technical and methodological terms, addressing the kind 
of knowledge that should be transferred during medical training (Frank and Danoff 
2007; Jones et al. 2001; Sales and Schlaff 2010) and how this should be done to 
prepare medical doctors for contemporary health care problems and changing public 
expectations (Teunissen et al. 2007; Schuwirth and van der Vleuten 2004). In 
contrast, we wish to move past the technical account of medical educational reform 
and argue that contemporary reform of medical curricula has implications that go far 
beyond teaching method aspects and the educational content of medical curricula. 
 This article seeks to explore the impact of successive reforms of medical 
vocational training programs on the capacity and authority of the medical profession 
to govern its own affairs. Our empirical focus is on reforms in postgraduate medical 
specialist training in Britain and the Netherlands. Both countries have considerably 
different health care systems and diverging state-profession relationships yet both 
face similar reforms to their medical training systems. The central questions we 
address are: What mechanisms of institutional reproduction and change are at play 
in the evolving transformation of the medical training regimes in Britain and the 
Netherlands, and what are the consequences of these transformations for self-
governance of medical professional training in both countries?  
 We conducted a comparative historical-institutional analysis of the origins, 
evolution, and transformation of the British and Dutch postgraduate medical 
educational systems. In accordance with recent literature on institutional change, we 
consider institutional change as a gradual, incremental and continuous process in 
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which institutions are subject to frequent negotiations (Thelen 2004; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005; Deeg and Jackson 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). We explore the 
implications of this theoretical perspective on gradual and negotiated institutional 
change in section 2. In the empirical sections (sections 3-5), we show how medical 
training regimes in Britain and the Netherlands have evolved over time due to the 
dialectic relations between endogenous and exogenous forces touching upon vested 
interests and power relations in the domestic health care systems. In the conclusions 
we compare the cases and discuss the consequences of regime transformation for 
professional self-governance. We argue that in both countries professional self-
governance has turned into more hybrid forms of co-regulation in which the medical 
profession, the state, and other private actors continuously reinstate their positions 
and related claims to authority. This shift to co-regulation also becomes visible in 
everyday clinical training practice where the traditional training-and-license models 
are increasingly supplemented, or replaced by more formal instruction, performance 
measurement and standardized practices of resident training, in order to enhance 
transparency and accountability of medical training. We argue that this enhanced 
visibility of former closed training practices may provide other stakeholders with new 
means to further reform postgraduate medical education and, with that, strengthen 
their authority in the medical training regime  We conclude by elaborating on the 
implications of this study for contemporary debates on institutional change. 
  
2. Transforming the Medical Training Regime 
 
A Social Regime Approach 
This article focuses on the transformation of one of the core institutions of the 
medical profession: the ownership and accompanying authority and autonomy of 
physicians over the vocational programs of medical professional training. Here we 
term the governance structure of medical training a ‘training regime’ embodying the 
distinct institutional configurations and agencies involved in medical training. 
Specifically, regimes are defined as “a set of rules stipulating expected behavior and 
‘ruling out’ behavior deemed to be undesirable. A regime is legitimate to the extent 
that the expectations it represents are enforced by the society in which it is 
embedded” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 12-13). Actors in the regime have explicitly 
undertaken to respect certain interest positions of other parties (including those not 
directly involved), to pursue certain substantive goals and values, and to follow 
certain procedures in their future interactions (Scharpf 1997). As such, regimes 
create order and stability in an otherwise chaotic and anarchic world.  
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 In order to understand the genesis, reproduction and change of a social 
regime, three important characteristics of regimes should be noted. Firstly, in terms 
of their composition, regimes are typically structured by a host of different institutions, 
together constituting an institutional configuration that makes up a regime. The actors 
involved can be seen as ‘purposeful’, meaning that they have their own interests and 
may undertake their own strategies to pursue their goals. Secondly, regimes can be 
specified at different levels of breadth, that is, they are embedded or nested in other 
regimes (Hood et al. 2001:10). The medical training regime, for example, is 
embedded in the overarching regime of the health care system. Given physicians’ 
central stake in health care, a medical training regime can in turn be regarded as one 
of the constituting regimes of any health care regime, meaning that changes in the 
medical training system may have profound effects on medical governance in 
general—and the other way around. 
 Thirdly, any distinct regime consists of a configuration of institutions, some 
with deeper roots (‘more important’) than others. Reforming these institutions is likely 
to be harder and more politicized than reforming institutions located more in the 
periphery of an institutional configuration. We refer to these deeply rooted institutions 
as ‘core institutions’. Although core institutions are complemented by other 
institutions, they are likely to dominate the governance mode in any regime and thus 
impose their logic on the institutional configuration of a regime as a whole. Core 
institutions are also dominant in terms of their authority claim in distinct regimes.  
In short, different sub-regimes and their accompanying institutional 
arrangements interact in the overarching social regime. To understand regime 
transformation, then, we should study the different sub-regimes, their mutual 
relationships, as well as any changes in one sub-regime that might spill over to the 
others. This analysis requires a subtle approach to the analysis of institutional 
change. 
 
Regime Transformation: Negotiating Power and Authority 
Institutions can be defined as the formal and informal rules of the game providing 
political agents with incentives and constraints that induce stable patterns of 
behavior. Institutional analysis generally shares an emphasis on the constraining 
character of institutions. Increasing returns, sunk costs, and positive feedback are 
powerful mechanisms that make institutional change largely path-dependent (Pierson 
2000; Mahoney 2000). In the path dependency view, institutional change is usually 
explained in two ways: either as minor, usually continuous change (seen most often) 
or as major change caused by some sort of exogenous shock opening up existing 
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paths (seen rarely) (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8). In the absence of analytical tools to 
characterize and explain more gradual institutional change, much of the institutional 
literature has relied—explicitly or implicitly—on a strongly punctuated-equilibrium 
model that draws on overly sharp distinctions between long periods of institutional 
stasis periodically interrupted by ‘critical junctures’ allowing for more or less radical 
reorganization (Tuohy 1999; True et al. 2007).  
 A growing body of literature is currently questioning these ideas of institutional 
resistance to change; for a discussion on this topic see also a special issue of this 
journal (JHPPL, August 2010).1 Scholars writing in the realm of institutional change 
display what Deeg and Jackson (2007) have called “a greater plasticity” of 
institutional evolution, meaning that institutional change is essentially a gradual and 
evolutionary process (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Hacker 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 
2010). Beyond the conventional view of institutions as stable constructs that owe 
their stability to powerful policy legacies and path-dependent processes, the authors 
point out that institutional change is essentially a gradual evolutionary process. The 
determinants of institutional change not only come from outside, but can also be 
produced endogenously by the very behavior that the institutions themselves have 
generated. In this view, a far more dynamic component is built in, wherein institutions 
represent compromises of relatively durable though still contested settlements based 
on specific coalitional dynamics. These coalitions, however, are always vulnerable to 
shifts as institutional rules are subject to varying interpretations and levels of 
enforcement. Therefore, they exhibit ambiguities that provide space for interested 
agents to exploit their efforts to alter them (Thelen 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
To understand these more gradual and incremental processes of institutional 
evolvement, one should consider the mechanisms of reproduction that help to 
sustain these institutions over time as well as the changes in institutions that 
gradually transform them into new directions. Institutional change can best be 
understood in terms of the ‘co-evolution’ of multiple institutions in a social regime 
(Thelen 2004: 32).  
 Power and authority are important features in institutional transformation 
analysis, stressing the role of agencies in social regimes (Moe 2005; Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010; White 2009). Such power relations create order as well as rigidities 
because all actors in a particular regime become more expert at pursuing courses of 
action that favor their own interests. Potential rivals, however, not only lack the power 
to challenge pre-established institutions, but lack the accepted expertise and 
                                                
1 Journal of Health Policy Politics and Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 2010 
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potential to convince others that alternative actions are practically viable (Crouch and 
Keune 2005: 85–86). This can be illustrated by the medical training regime in which 
specialization, the application of medical knowledge, technical skills and tacit 
knowledge have long been accepted as dominant sources of expertise, thereby 
excluding actors without this kind of knowledge. However, notwithstanding these 
deeply embedded power relations, institutional change often involves compromises 
or contested settlement between coalitions of countervailing powers and always 
carries an element of dynamism or ambiguity, implying that regime stability is not 
automaticly generated but depends on the ongoing mobilization and reproduction of 
power (Light 2000). Light proposes a model of “countervailing powers”, in which one 
set of interests, such as medical professional dominance over postgraduate medical 
education, overextends its attempts to dominate the field, prompting the regrouping 
of other actors and interests (like the state). As a consequence, the medical training 
regime swings back and forth between different kinds of authority (see also Mendel 
and Scott 2010).  
Contemporary theories on institutional change put more emphasis on the 
ambiguity and dynamics of institutional evolvement. They stress the crucial 
importance of the interaction between the political context, strategic actors and the 
properties of institutions themselves in explaining institutional change (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010: 31). Changes in existing procedures, ideologies and structures that 
may be due to changes in the overarching social regime or in adjacent regimes can 
lead to conflicting logic and authority claims, as various actors have their own 
identities, interests and commitments to different goals and objectives. Specifically, if 
new expectations and related kinds of knowledge emerge and become legitimate— 
such as in health care, where is increasing acceptance of the necessity of other kinds 
of expertise besides medical technical expertise to provide good care (e.g. good 
doctor-patient communication and organizational knowledge; see Zuiderent-Jerak 
and Berg 2010, Waring 2007)—vested authority becomes contested. Eventually, 
such conflicts may become more manifest and thereby weaken the legitimacy of 
settled interests, providing openings for new actors and other interests to renegotiate 
established institutions and claim a share in the authority over these regimes.  
 To conclude, in contrast to earlier accounts on institutional change, the 
regime perspective adopted in this article allows for a more subtle analysis of gradual 
institutional change to understand the transformative processes of the medical 
training regime. The analysis entails a thorough understanding of the origins, 
evolution, and transformation of the medical training regimes in Britain and the 
Netherlands. The next sections turn to empirical cases of medical educational reform. 
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First, we provide insight into the institutional contexts of medical governance. Then 
we move on to the comparative and historical-institutional analysis of medical 
educational reform in both countries. 
 
3. Medical Governance in Britain and the Netherlands 
Since its inception in 1948, the British NHS system has been based on the principle 
of universal free access to state-provided health care funded by taxation. Hospital 
specialists are salaried employees of state-owned hospitals, and general 
practitioners work as independent contractors with the NHS.  
 The Dutch health care system can be portrayed as a neo-corporatist 
associational system with predominantly public funding and privately owned and 
operated health care providers. Contrary to their British colleagues, most Dutch 
physicians work in entrepreneurial medical specialty partnerships (maatschappen) in 
association with a hospital. Notwithstanding these differences, the medical profession 
has always possessed considerable self-regulatory authority in both countries.  
In the Netherlands, medical self-regulation fits in nicely with the corporatist 
system in which the state has major constitutional responsibilities but depends highly 
on privately working professional practitioners and private not-for profit institutions to 
accomplish this (Helderman, 2007). On the national level Dutch physicians are 
represented by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Maatschappij tot bevordering van de Geneeskunst, KNMG) to which most physicians 
belong. The KNMG acts as an advocate of medical professional interests and is 
formally involved in the regulation of medical practice. The interests of the various 
medical specialties are also defended by the specialty associations that are more or 
less commensurable with the British Royal Medical Colleges. Specialty associations 
play an important role in the formulation of educational programs and clinical 
guidelines for their medical specialty. 
The early days of the British NHS have been described as ‘the politics of the 
double bed’ (Klein 1990) as initially the NHS offered a state-based health care 
system while physicians kept a large degree of autonomy. The British medical 
profession has a deeply rooted tradition of self-governance, with the British Medical 
Association (BMA), the Royal Medical Colleges, and the General Medical Council as 
the most prominent regulatory bodies. The BMA serves as a trade union as well as a 
professional organization. The Royal Medical Colleges are the professional bodies of 
the various medical specialties that play important roles in the regulation of 
professional training programs and entry to the professional community (Klein 2006). 
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An independent regulatory body, the GMC is involved in quality regulation of the 
medical profession as a whole (Irvine 2006).  
A comparative analysis of the transformation of medical training regimes in 
Britain and the Netherlands thus seem to fit a most different case design (George 
and Bennett 2005). While Britain and the Netherlands differ in important institutional 
characteristics of their health care systems, when it comes to the self-regulatory 
authority of medical doctors, they share important similarities. In the last two 
decades, however, the self-regulatory capacity of the medical profession has 
increasingly been challenged by a number of exogenous developments.  
In Britain, the introduction of the internal market and performance indicators 
had an important effect. The Thatcher government introduced the internal market in 
1991, in an attempt to reduce health care budgets and create more efficiency in 
public sector spending. Central elements were the introduction of a purchaser-
provider split and a system of provider competition in which money would follow the 
patient (Bevan and Robinson 2005). After the Labour party returned to power in 
1997, successive governments more or less continued the policies of the internal 
market, with more emphasis on performance control and state-based regulation 
(Helderman et al. 2011). As a result, medical practitioners have been confronted with 
many managerial instruments such as standards of good practice and procedures for 
monitoring, evaluating, and sanctioning medical performance (Bevan and Robinson 
2005, Helderman et al. 2011).  
The Netherlands went even further in the reform attempt by enacting a new 
health insurance system and incorporating a system of regulated competition in its 
corporatist health care system. The reforms began with the Dekker Commission 
advisory report of 1987 but it took almost 20 years before the suggested reforms 
were fully implemented. Meanwhile incremental changes were made to enhance the 
institutional and technical feasibility of regulated competition, while keeping control 
over health care supply and prices (Helderman et al. 2005). The new Health 
Insurance Act was finally enacted on January 1, 2006, also considered the date on 
which the Dutch turned to the system of regulated competition. Citizens can now 
choose between health insurers, while health care insurers aim to contract efficient 
care of good quality with competing health care providers. Despite the current 
emphasis on competition, Dutch health care is still heavily regulated to contain macro 
healthcare expenditures and guarantee equity (Helderman 2007).  
 Against the background of these overarching system-level reforms the reform 
of medical training regimes became increasingly politicized in both countries in the 
2000s. However, the way these system-level reforms interfered with the more 
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gradual and endogenous modernization of the medical training regimes asks for a 
subtle and detailed analysis of medical training reform. In the next two sections, we 
focus specifically on the origins, evolution, and transformation of medical training 
regimes in Britain and the Netherlands. 
 
4. Medical Vocational Training Reform in Britain 
 
Enhancing Unity in British Medical Education 
In the early 19th century, Britain had no structured system of medical education. 
There was extreme variation in the quality of medical education and thus in the 
quality of medical practitioners (Nutton 1995). This slowly started to change with the 
introduction of the Medical Act in 1858, when the medical profession was confronted 
by a fast-developing body of medical knowledge, which increasingly made clear the 
distinction between real medical treatment and quackery. The profession felt an 
increasing need to set up a registration system to distinguish good doctors from the 
bad. A registration system would also enhance the social status and income of 
physicians as it would establish a monopoly on medical care (Loudon 1995). The 
establishment of the registration system meant a significant push toward skill 
standardization, which was further enhanced by the 1858 Act’s requirement to follow 
a four-year Bachelor’s degree to practice medicine. The General Council of Medical 
Education and Registration was also established through the Medical Act. It was 
abbreviated to General Medical Council (GMC) in 1951. The GMC was licensed to 
provide a register of qualified doctors and had to ensure adequate standards for 
medical education. Originally, the GMC was appointed an independent authority 
funded by physicians’ mandatory payments. All council members were medical 
practitioners representing various medical corporations. In daily practice, however, 
the Royal Medical Colleges set and controlled the standards and practices for their 
specialties. Yet, training practices—and outcomes—varied considerably due to local 
circumstances. 
 With the introduction of the NHS, the professionally dominated system 
remained largely intact. However, because of the importance of medical education to 
the quality of health service provision and the fact that medical education was mainly 
paid from NHS resources, medical education increasingly became a political 
concern. Initially, political involvement was mainly restricted to undergraduate 
medical education as the Royal Medical Colleges successfully defended their 
medical curricula against outside interference. Nonetheless, several political attempts 
were made to reform medical vocational training. A significant example was the 
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Royal Commission on Medical Education in 1965. In its final report, published in 
1968, the Royal Commission recommended a smooth transition between different 
training phases by strengthening ties–and thus alignment–between undergraduate 
schools, universities, regional hospitals and Royal Medical Colleges. It recommended 
changing teaching methods, curricula contents by also including non-medical 
technical courses, as well as the examination system (Townsend 1968). The 
commission argued for a specialist register to recognize qualified doctors. However, 
many of its recommendations were not implemented, or simply failed, because of 
resistance from the Royal Medical Colleges. 
Some issues, however, were readdressed a few years later by the Merrison 
Commission, installed in the mid 1970s to advise the government on a deepening 
conflict between the GMC, Royal Medical Colleges, and medical practitioners 
threatening the continuity of NHS service provision. Although the Merrison 
Commission addressed broader issues related to medical governance, about a 
quarter of its final report was dedicated to the topic of medical education. As with the 
Royal Commission, it recommended introducing a specialist register and expressed 
the need to unify the medical educational system. Although very critical of the part 
the GMC had played in the conflict with the medical practitioners (Parry 1976), the 
commission argued that the GMC should play a pivotal role in the coordination of the 
various training phases. The Merrison report paved the way for the 1978 Medical 
Practitioners Act. The Act launched a new GMC, including lay membership in order 
to influence the GMC’s thinking from outside the profession (Stacey 1992). It also 
established a special education committee inside the GMC to coordinate all stages of 
medical education. However, in everyday practice it appeared difficult for the GMC to 
fulfill this role because of the increasing authority of the Royal Medical Colleges over 
medical affairs due to fast medical technological development and associated 
specialization. 
Although neither inquiry led directly to fundamental changes in the British 
medical training regime, they did however redirect attention to expectations and 
interests outside medical education and sowed the seed for more outside 
interference in medical vocational training in subsequent decades. In other words, 
medical training was no longer the exclusive domain of the medical profession. 
 
Building and Losing Trust in the British Medical Training Regime  
In the mid 1990s newly introduced European legislation required significant changes 
in medical training governance to guarantee mutual recognition of specialist medical 
qualifications between Britain and European partners. The Calman Commission, 
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named after its initiator, then Chief Medical Officer Sir Kenneth Calman, was installed 
to fit British medical vocational training to the new requirements. Noticeably, the 
Calman Commission executed its task in close collaboration with the medical 
profession as well as other stakeholders in professional training, such as the NHS, 
universities, medical schools, and postgraduate deans. The reforms not only 
addressed institutional arrangements but also aimed to improve medical curricula. 
Key elements were competitive entry to training posts, structured training programs 
across all specialties with regular assessment of medical residents, the introduction 
of Specialist Registrar as a new training grade, and the introduction of the Certificate 
of Completion of Specialist Training (CCST) as evidence of competence to mark the 
end of training. The Specialist Training Authority (STA) of the Royal Medical Colleges 
was introduced for overall supervision in postgraduate medical 
education.Remarkably, given all the years of professional resistance, a specialist 
register was established (Calman et al. 1999). Generally, the reforms were regarded 
as a successful collaboration to improve postgraduate medical education. The 
Calman Commission was highly appreciated for the time that it took to deliberate on 
reforms and the trust it created between the different agencies in the British medical 
training regime.  
 Yet the emerging trust relationships between medical doctors and other 
stakeholders in the medical training regime were still very fragile. The success of the 
Calman reforms was soon overshadowed by the disclosure of scandals in pediatric 
cardiac surgery in Bristol and the Shipman case. These notorious failings set in 
motion successive policy measures to enhance medical performance management. 
The Bristol inquiry, published in 2001, suggested replacing the STA with the GMC. In 
response, the Department of Health said it preferred an independent agency to 
supervise medical vocational training and announced the establishment of the 
Postgraduate Medical Education and Training Board (PMETB). The PMETB came 
into being in 2005 as part of the reforms of Modernizing Medical Careers (MMC), the 
topic we turn to next.   
 
Modernizing Medical Careers 
MMC can be traced back to two policy documents: the NHS Plan (Department of 
Health 2000) and Unfinished Business (Donaldson 2002). The NHS Plan stressed 
the need for a larger workforce to improve access as well as quality of care. The 
report set out a commitment to a health service increasingly delivered by fully trained 
doctors rather than those in training. It announced a shorter training period as one of 
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the policies that would accomplish this (Klein 2006). Interestingly, the government 
now started to wield medical training as a strategic tool to achieve other NHS goals. 
The Department of Health asked Chief Medical Officer Sir Liam Donaldson to 
work on a future prospect of medical vocational training, particularly addressing the 
Senior House Officer (SHO) grade, which in the 2000 report was identified as one of 
the causes of the delay in training consultants. In his final report, entitled Unfinished 
Business, Donaldson went beyond the SHO problem. Unfinished Business presented 
a critical image of the British medical educational system and recommended far-
reaching reforms. First, it outlined a time-capped structured training program with 
seamless transitions between training phases. Second, it proposed a new admission 
procedure to provide equal opportunities to applicants. Third and in line with the 
earlier government’s announcement, Unfinished Business recommended handing 
over the supervision of the training program to the PMETB (Corrigan and Pinchen 
2009). Feeling a sense of urgency to reform medical curricula because of growing 
political and public distrust, the medical profession was moderately positive about the 
proposed reforms. With the experience of the Calman reforms in mind, the 
professionals felt committed to another round of reforming medical curricula. 
 Yet, whereas the Calman reforms deliberately proceeded gradually, in order 
not to undermine fragile trust relationships, MMC happened almost overnight. Many 
of the recommendations set out in Unfinished Business were implemented at once by 
the Department of Health. The first measure was to establish PMETB in 2005. The 
second was to implement a special foundation program in the first two years of 
medical vocational training to improve the transition between the various training 
phases. A third major change was the introduction of a new appointment system, the 
Medical Training and Application System (MTAS). The MTAS aimed to enhance the 
validity and reliability of the admission procedure to vocational training (Madden and 
Madden 2007). A special review group with representatives from the BMA, Royal 
Medical Colleges, and governmental bodies was set up to coordinate the reforms. 
Although the medical profession was formally included in the review group, their 
actual influence was rather limited (House of Commons 2008). 
  
The Battle of Modernizing Medical Careers 
The selection of new trainees became the central focus of MMC. The MTAS was 
based on explicit selection criteria for entering medical vocational training in that all 
candidates could apply for the training position of their choice through a nationally 
administered electronic portal. Short-listed candidates would then be interviewed by 
local attendants and offers would be made to the most successful candidates. The 
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overall idea was that the recruitment system would become much more open and 
equal this way. By the end of 2006, the Department of Health set out plans to 
introduce MTAS as soon as January 2007. The medical associations warned that this 
would be too soon as the system was not ready for it. Moreover, they feared a 
shortage of training posts. A week before the system went live, the BMA asked for 
suspension of the new procedure, but the Department of Health refused and pressed 
ahead with its plans.  
Right from the start, the system was heavily criticized by candidates and local 
assessors. There were serious concerns that the best applicants were not being 
short-listed for interviews. Moreover, the number of applicants was far higher than 
expected due to overseas applicants as well as applications from doctors already in 
the system who so far had not had good career opportunities. This created fierce 
competition for posts in many areas and made thousands of young doctors deeply 
anxious about their future prospects (House of Commons 2008, Madden and 
Madden 2007). In the spring of 2007, the widely shared discontent led to a revolt 
against MMC, and in particular against the MTAS. The onset was a letter from a 
group of senior physicians published in the British Medical Journal that shared their 
concerns about MTAS as well as the role of PMETB in professional training (Brown 
2007). Additionally, a local group of surgeons refused to proceed with the selection 
procedure, effectively sabotaging the new system, as they felt that the system was 
unable to select the best candidates (Hawkes 2007). The revolt was followed closely 
by the British media. Matters came to head when a special group, the Douglas 
Review led by the Vice Chair of the Academy of Royal Medical Colleges, was 
installed to investigate the problems. The Douglas Review decided to proceed with 
the MTAS nevertheless (Eaton 2007a). This decision was heavily criticized by 
practicing medical practitioners, who felt unrepresented by their governing bodies.  
Feeling that their career options were negatively influenced by the MTAS, 
junior doctors organized demonstrations against the system in London and Glasgow 
(Eaton 2007b). They increased the pressure by going to court to ask for the MTAS to 
be quashed. Although it refused their application, the Higher Court was very critical of 
the MTAS, calling the system disastrous (House of Commons 2008). In April 2007, 
during an interview on BBC Radio, Health Secretary of State Patricia Hewitt 
apologized to junior doctors for the crisis, saying that the application scheme had 
caused ‘needless anxiety and distress’ and repeating the apology to parliament later 
that month. The BMA welcomed the government’s acknowledgement of the problem 
but stated that an apology was not enough. Shortly after, two critical incidents with 
the MTAS made personal information publicly accessible. These breaches of privacy 
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proved the last straw; the Secretary of State decided to abolish the MTAS and 
handed the selection procedure over to local deaneries.  
So, in sharp contrast to the Calman reforms ten years earlier, MMC became 
highly politicized, with the MTAS at the center of the heated debate. Medical 
practitioners not only protested the government, but also turned against their own 
representatives in the reforms. The MTAS was regarded as nothing less than a direct 
attack on one of the core institutions of the medical training regime. Although the 
medical profession had learned to deliberate, discuss and even compromise with 
external stakeholders on many other aspects of medical governance, the MTAS was 
simply not acceptable. 
Disapproval was not only directed at the MTAS but MMC as a whole became 
highly contested. This illustrates the spillover effect of the system of recruiting new 
trainees as a core institution in the medical training regime. This does not mean, 
however, that the reform of postgraduate medical education was put on hold. In 
practice, for example, there was a significant shift to more outcomes based medical 
training. A competency framework has been implemented in all residency training 
programs, listing the competencies a resident should master. Furthermore, residents 
have become obliged to have their competencies assessed and signed off by 
consultants regularly in order to obtain licensure to practice medicine (Noordegraaf 
2011  
 After the abolishment of the MTAS, medical associations successfully asked 
for an inquiry, which was led by the physician Sir John Tooke. In its final report, 
published in 2008, the Tooke Commission claimed that the problems had been 
caused partly because the medical profession had been bypassed in the reform 
process. The Tooke Commission stated, “[S]trong professional involvement […] is 
essential to ensure plans are co-owned and supported to ensure that those with 
insight into the likely evolution of specialty practice are able to influence policy” 
(Tooke 2008:97). They proposed establishing an independent, professional-led 
advisory body for medical training and education, further recommending a merger of 
PMETB and GMC. Despite some reluctance, the government agreed with the merger 
of PMETB and the GMC, which became effective in 2010. A few months later, Lord 
Darzi's report NHS Next Stage Review was published, announcing the creation of 
Medical Education England (MEE) as an independent non-departmental advisory 
board to be headed by a physician. This body has to ensure that “policy, 
professional, and service perspectives are integrated in the curricula” (Darzi 
2008:73). Note here that the authority over medical vocational training is not handed 
back to the Royal Medical Colleges. Instead, the medical training regime has become 
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increasingly co-regulated by independent bodies comprising both professional, lay 
and government members. 
 At first sight, MMC may be considered a classical critical juncture, opening up 
a window of opportunity for the involvement of external stakeholders in the medical 
training regime. In this classical portray of institutional change, institutional 
development is envisioned as long periods of institutional stability alternating with 
brief periods of revolutionary upheaval in which there is room for more substantial 
changes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Helderman 2007). The historical-institutional 
analysis presented above, however, reveals a far more gradual and evolutionary 
reform process. Indeed, the medical training regime as a professional-controlled 
system had already started to transform into a more co-regulated regime in the 
1960s and 1970s. Both endogenous and exogenous factors were at stake in this 
process. Whereas in the second half of the 20th century endogenous changes led to 
incremental changes in the medical training regime to adapt medical vocational 
training to new circumstances (e.g. the GMC obtaining an albeit small role in 
governing medical vocational training), exogenous forces, such as new European 
legislation paved the way for further state involvement and a more structured and 
formalized postgraduate medical education.  
 This gradual transformation process was interrupted in the late 1990s, when 
growing distrust in the medical profession provided the government with legitimate 
means to claim partial authority over the professional training system. However, by 
rushing past the objections of the medical profession and implementing a new 
recruitment system to wield other NHS goals, the government touched upon a core 
institution of professional self-regulating authority, provoking a revolt of practicing 
clinicians against the government as well as against their own professional bodies. 
The government had to back down, painfully realizing that such reforms could not be 
succeeded without the necessary medical practitioners’ support and expertise. The 
MMC debacle led to a renegotiation of authority in the medical training regime putting 
in place new governance arrangements of co-regulation. Moreover, the involvement 
of other stakeholders introduced new kinds of knowledge in medical training that 
increasingly gained legitimacy. As a consequence, in everyday medical training 
practice there was a shift from the traditional, implicit training-and-licensure model to 
a competency / performance model which put more emphasis on the formal 
assessment of residents’ skills and knowledge.  
 Compared to the British case, the Dutch reforms were a far more deliberate 
process, though not less contested. In the next section, we turn to the Netherlands 
and explore the transformation of the Dutch medical training regime.  
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5. Medical Vocational Training Reform in the Netherlands 
 
Establishing a Self-regulatory Structure for Medical Education 
Similar to Britain, the Netherlands of the 19th century lacked any formal certification 
and examination system to assess the quality of training that apprentices received in 
a given workplace. This slowly started to change with the establishment of the Dutch 
Medical Association (NMG) in 1849. The NMG had to overcome practical differences 
by enhancing the unity and status of the medical profession (Goudsmit 1978). One 
measure it introduced was a university-based medical curriculum to train doctors with 
uniform authority. Overall, the role of the government in medical education was 
restricted to subsidizing medical faculties.  
Increasing specialization between 1900 and 1930 enhanced the competition 
between generalist and specialist practitioners, threatening the hard-won unity of the 
medical profession. Most doctors realized that further formalization of specialization 
was necessary to, as one of the medical leaders pointed out, ‘prevent chaos and 
ensure quality‘(Klazinga 1996). In 1931, the Specialist Registration Commission was 
established, aimed not only to register medical specialists but also to set formal 
requirements for medical curricula and select the hospitals that would become 
training sites.  
 After World War II successive Dutch governments tried to gain more control 
of medical education, mainly driven by concerns about rising health care costs. 
Initially, measures were directed only at undergraduate medical education as the 
medical associations successfully resisted external interference in their postgraduate 
training programs. In the early 1950s, however, after rising complaints about the 
quality of hospitals selected as training sites, the government installed a state 
commission to investigate medical vocational training (Klazinga 1996). This inquiry 
led to the introduction of the Central Board for the Recognition and Registration of 
Medical Specialists (CC, later Central Board of Medical Specialists, CCMS) in 1961. 
The CCMS, which fell under the aegis of the Royal Dutch Medical Association 
(KNMG) had to regulate and control the quality of medical training. The ten years 
needed to create this board, prior to its establishment, reflect the severe negotiations 
between the medical associations and the government about the composition and 
authority assigned to the board. In its final appearance, it comprised members of the 
medical associations and medical faculties, as well as representatives from the 
government and teaching hospitals. Although government and hospitals thus became 
formally involved in medical vocational training—adding a new layer to the existing 
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system dominated by professionals—medical practitioners still held a majority of 
seats and dominated the board’s policies and decisions (Klazinga 1996). 
 By this time, the quality requirements of medical curricula were discussed 
mainly in terms of years of training at a selected training site and the skills of the 
educator. This changed in the 1980s when requirements were sharpened because a 
rising number of medical residents had put the capacity of the old master/trainee 
system under pressure. The CCMS, in consultation with the specialty associations, 
formulated new requirements to improve training quality, such as a minimal number 
of hospital beds and the number of patient contacts. External peer-reviewed site-visit 
programs for teaching hospitals were introduced to monitor and assess the quality of 
local training programs (van Herk et al. 2001).  Although these measures enhanced 
the formalization of the medical training system, it was also widely recognized that 
many of the requirements were not met in daily practice (Klazinga 1996).  
 At the same time, government interference in postgraduate medical education 
increased. This was mainly due to an increasing felt need to adapt the number of 
doctors-in-training to future health care expectations. To this end, the Capacity Board 
was established in 1999. Typically for the Dutch corporatist system, this board was 
an independent body set up by the Ministry of Health in close collaboration with the 
medical associations, health insurers and hospital associations. Yearly, the board 
determines the number of training posts for each medical specialty. These numbers 
are only maximums, however, meaning that a specific specialty association can also 
decide not to fill all posts, for example when fearing over-capacity (Frissen 2008). 
 Hence, as in Britain, external interference in Dutch postgraduate medical 
education increased in the second half of the 20th century but it evolved differently 
than in Britain. The reforms of Dutch medical vocation training were very similar to 
the mechanism of institutional layering, in which new institutional elements are 
grafted onto the existing system, thereby touching upon powerful vested interests 
(Schlicker 2001). In recent literature on gradual institutional change, layering is 
recognized as one of the key mechanisms of institutional transformation. It may alter 
the overall trajectory of institutional development by allowing alternative courses of 
action to involve actors alongside the established trajectories without abolishing 
established institutions (Thelen 2004:, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Over time, 
however, alternative trajectories may grow into new structures of governance, 
enabling non-dominant actors to gain power, and thereby enforce changes, in the 
existing governance regime. This is exactly what happened during the medical 
training reforms of the 2000s, which we turn to below. 
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Adapting to New Requirements 
By the late 1990s, medical professional leaders and politicians were increasingly 
arguing that medical curricula were not keeping up with major changes in the health 
care arena. An important turning point was marked by a speech by the then Minister 
of Health, Els Borst-Eilers, addressed to the Dutch Medical Association in 1999. 
Minister Borst, a physician before entering politics, drew attention to upcoming 
changes in health care, such as an increasing need for technically skilled healthcare 
workers who are also good communicators and organizers of care. The minister 
stressed the need for more efficient training and a shorter training trajectory. Reforms 
of the medical curricula were necessary to accomplish this, she argued. Typically for 
the public-private dependency in Dutch medical governance, the minister’s appeal for 
reform was followed by two policy documents, one by the medical association, the 
other by a government appointed commission. The first was Tomorrow’s Doctors 
published in 2002 (De Arts van Straks: Een Nieuw Medisch Opleidingscontinuüm, 
Commissie Meyboom 2002). In short, the report painted a prospect for the medical 
education system of shorter follow-up periods between the training phases and a 
curriculum based on modern educational insights into improving the quality of 
workplace-based learning. Tomorrow’s Doctors was followed by Tomorrow’s Care 
(De Zorg van Morgen: Flexibiliteit en Samenhang, Commissie Legrand 2003) that 
supported the recommendations made in Tomorrow’s Doctors yet placed more 
emphasis on improving the efficiency of professional training.  
At the same time, and similar to the British case, the medical profession was 
confronted with new European requirements for medical curricula that established a 
maximum length of medical training trajectories, and restricted the number of working 
hours for residents. The medical profession, feeling an increasing sense of urgency 
to adapt their training programs to changing outside demands, announced a 
sweeping reform of medical curricula in 2004. Following the decree, all postgraduate 
medical curricula had to be redesigned following a competency-based model that 
specified clear end terms. In addition, residents’ skills had to be tested regularly 
using special clinical assessment tools. Overall, the reforms can best be understood 
as an attempt to render medical vocational training in a more formal and transparent 
structure, without losing professional values and the traditional method of 
apprenticeship-based learning. In daily practice, the training reforms focused strongly 
on restructuring individual training schemes and the use of modern educational tools. 
Educational specialists, who had no access to postgraduate medical education 
before, were hired to implement the reforms. Special courses were developed to 
teach the doctors how to work with the new teaching and evaluation methods.  
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So, the reforms that started as an attempt to keep up with changing health 
care demands were gradually reframed as educational improvements to existing 
training programs, yet without making any substantial changes to the governance 
structure (de Bont et al. 2008). 
 By this time, however, the medical profession had to face significant policy 
developments that also impinged on their self-regulating capacity in medical training. 
These policies were closely related to the introduction of regulated competition in 
Dutch health care. The most significant policy change turned out to be the 
introduction of the Education Fund to subsidize training posts. Up until then, medical 
vocational training was paid for through health insurance premiums. Teaching 
hospitals received more money (were more expensive) than hospitals without 
residency training programs. When the system of regulated competition was 
announced in 2005, the difference in costs became a problem as teaching hospitals 
could not compete with non-teaching hospitals. As medical training was considered a 
general good, it was decided to introduce a tax-based fund to subsidize residency 
training. This Education Fund was administered by the Ministry of Health.  
Initially, the medical professional association agreed, considering the 
Education Fund as a purely administrative tool to protect vocational training from the 
possibly harmful consequences of competition. A year later, however, their opinion 
changed entirely, when the government introduced a new distribution model for the 
allocation of training posts among teaching hospitals. The government announced 
that the allocation of training posts would partly depend on measured teaching 
quality. Better training quality, it argued, would be rewarded with more training posts.  
It should be emphasized at this point that the distribution of training posts had 
always been a professional matter regulated by the medical specialty associations. 
Although the government had become involved in the late 1990s with the 
establishment of the Capacity Board, the allocation of training posts among the 
training sites (the hospital departments) was still fully controlled by the specific 
specialty associations working in close collaboration with local clinical teachers. The 
distribution procedure was viewed as a highly delicate process as it involved money 
(because of disbursement from the Education Fund, and also because a medical 
resident provides medical services and is thus cheap labor, especially in the last 
training phase when a resident acts almost on the level of a fully trained physician), 
as well as reputation (having more residents means more prestige).The Education 
Fund impinged on the professional distribution system in three ways. Firstly, because 
all training posts were subsidized separately and each teaching clinician had to 
account for the money received, the fund rendered the mechanisms and related 
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powers of the distribution system visible. Secondly, as the fund was paid out of public 
resources it legitimized the Minister of Health to set requirements for claiming 
resources, thus intervening in the traditional closed practices of allocating training 
placements. Thirdly, as the resources were paid to the hospital administration and 
not to the teaching clinicians directly, it provided new interests for hospital boards to 
become involved in local medical training. Indeed, as medical training generated 
income it was attractive to create more training posts. This extra income was even 
more warranted in the light of increasing competition on price between hospital 
institutes. Whereas the medical profession often preferred fewer training posts to 
guarantee some kind of scarcity favoring the economic position of the particular 
specialty group, hospital boards preferred more training posts. 
  Here we see another example of the development of a new institutional layer 
into the medical training regime. In the next section we will demonstrate how the 
Education Fund, introduced as an administrative tool, gradually turned into a 
strategic instrument to control the allocation of training placements, thus enhancing 
the politicization of medical vocational training. Put dramatically, the innocent 
Education Fund turned into a treacherous Trojan horse that seriously challenged the 
authority monopoly of medical doctors. 
 
Defending and Redefining Professional Jurisdictions 
The medical profession soon realized that “they had sold their autonomy to the 
government”, as one of the medical leaders pointed out. After announcing the 
assignment of training posts on the basis of measured quality, in 2009 the 
government initiated a project that offered limited additional training placements to 
two medical specialties (surgery and internal medicine) according to measured 
performance. However, both medical specialties refused to cooperate, arguing that 
the quality indicators were invalid. The Department of Health thereupon postponed its 
project and commissioned education specialists and policy makers to develop a 
series of performance indicators that could be used to measure training quality.  
The medical associations were dismayed by the new situation, and gathered 
together to develop a strategy to forestall further government control. Opting to 
maintain control by initiating change themselves (rather than being its victim), the 
associations designed a counter-project that would enhance competition on training 
quality, but placed at the other extreme of the training trajectory: medical residents 
could follow a time-capped apprenticeship at the end of their residency in a teaching 
hospital of their choice. The performance indicators would allow choices to be based 
on learning opportunities for specialization as well as measured teaching quality. 
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Although (former) Minister Klink doubted whether this plan would indeed stimulate 
competition on quality, he decided to embrace the profession’s initiative. He did warn 
that it could only be a first step towards more competition in residency training.  
Subsequently, a special pilot project developed ‘displays’ where local clinical 
teachers advertised their end-term apprenticeships, providing insight into learning 
opportunities as well as into training quality scores. Ironically, but also typical for the 
interdependencies between the medical profession and the government in Dutch 
medical governance, the project was funded by the Ministry of Health. In the second 
phase, scheduled for 2011, senior medical residents gain the opportunity to apply to 
the advertised training positions. Though the outcomes are still unclear, medical 
residents have responded enthusiastically to these new opportunities for getting a 
grip on their training and their professional career. Although it is too early to draw 
conclusions, this empowerment of medical residents vis-à-vis their clinical teachers 
(the physicians) may eventually have consequences for the traditional master-
apprentice structure as it enables residents to leave a teaching setting in the training 
phase in which they possess the highest clinical productivity. 
In sum, the Dutch reforms of medical vocational training can be characterized 
by processes of institutional layering through which new governance arrangements in 
the Dutch medical training regime have been introduced alongside already existing 
ones. It is along these alternative trajectories that, from the 1960s onwards, 
endogenous changes in regulatory bodies (e.g. introducing the CCMS and later on 
establishing the Capacity Board) gradually enforced state authority in the medical 
training regime. This induced new forms of state-profession coalitions in which 
hospital organizations increasingly took part. In daily practice, however, the medical 
profession still dominated the coalitions. Surprisingly, the introduction of regulated 
competition in the Dutch health care arena—a significant shift in the overarching 
system of health care governance—encroached considerably upon the vested power 
of the medical profession in professional training. Whereas the Education Fund was 
introduced to protect medical education against the dynamics of competition, it 
eventually brought new ambiguities in the medical training regime (see Jacobs 2010 
for a similar observation). The fund opened up the traditional closed practices of 
training post allocation, providing other stakeholders (e.g. the government, hospital 
boards) with new legitimate means to intervene in the process. As such, the 
Education Fund indirectly empowered the government and hospital boards, 
challenging vested medical professional authority in the allocation of training 
placements. Typically for the Dutch neo-corporatist system this resulted in a new 
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negotiation process in which the medical profession attempted to regain authority 
over their professional recruitment system. 
 
6. Conclusions  
A comparative analysis of the transformation of medical training regimes in Britain 
and the Netherlands comes close to a classical most different case design (George 
and Bennett 2005) in the sense that both countries differ on many institutional 
characteristics except for one crucial independent variable, namely, the self-
regulatory authority of the medical profession with regard to their vocational training 
programs. The paper has demonstrated that in Britain and the Netherlands medical 
training regimes have transformed from predominantly professionally-controlled 
systems into regimes of co-regulation. There are important differences between the 
two countries in terms of the strategies that were enacted as well as in the nature of 
the interactions between the medical profession, state and other stakeholders, which 
can be explained from the nested institutional structure of both countries. 
Nonetheless, the outcomes of the reform of the two medical training regimes were 
quite similar. In Britain and the Netherlands medical professional bodies had to give 
up their monopoly in professional training and increasingly had to share power with 
other stakeholders. Yet, in the end, in both countries reforms got politicized, and 
contested, when they touched upon the core institution of medical training regimes: 
the recruitment of new trainees.  
In Britain, the increasing emphasis on medical performance management and 
the government’s subsequent attempt to wield medical education to improve the 
NHS, led to MMC and the highly contested new recruitment system. In the 
Netherlands, seemingly unintentionally, regulated competition in the overarching 
regime of health care touched upon vested professional power over the selection and 
placement of new recruits. The new authority claims over medical vocational training 
ended up in a clash between the medical profession and other stakeholders, in 
particular the state. In both countries authority conflicts were more or less settled by 
agreeing on a regime of co-regulation that reconfirmed and perpetuated the 
importance of medical professional expertise and the accompanying authority claim 
of the medical profession. This co-regulation forced the medical professional to adapt 
its training practices to new kinds of knowledge that have increasingly become 
legitimate in the health care arena, like enhanced transparency and accountability of 
medical training practice.  
At first glance this may be read as a proof of professional authority over their 
vocational system in which the profession ‘only’ has to adapt its practices to the 
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overarching agenda of health policy reform in order to maintain its legitimate 
authority. However, a closer look reveals that adaptations like structuring training 
programs and enhancing visibility of former closed training practices may provide 
other stakeholders with new means to impose their logics on medical training. These 
changes may set in motion more profound reforms of the distribution and allocation 
of authority in the medical training regime. The attempts of the Dutch government to 
introduce competition on training posts is a striking example hereof. Moreover, 
contemporary changes in medical education may also make physicians (especially 
the ones that are now trained in the new performance based system) more likely to 
accept more profound forms of performance based management in their (future) 
work (see also White 2009). Seen this way, the transition to forms of co-regulation 
has not reconfirmed professional authority over the medical training regime, but, 
instead, has opened up the former closed practices of medical vocational training by 
installing new kinds of ambiguities that provide space for further reforms in the (near) 
future. 
Analytically, the paper shows that the self-governance of medical professional 
training cannot be fully explained by a model of countervailing powers but requires a 
more dynamic explanatory approach directed at the co-evolution of changes in 
multiple institutions that make up an institutional configuration. In Britain and the 
Netherlands medical training regimes co-evolved with systemic health care reforms. 
Initially, these reforms were located in the periphery of the medical training regime. 
However, as soon as the reforms touched upon the core institutions of the medical 
training regimes, co-evolution became far more politicized, ending up in a clash of 
contradicting authority claims. Indeed, MMC entailed a much wider reform than the 
introduction of the MTAS but its failure had a large impact on other forms of external 
involvement in postgraduate medical training as well.  
Overall, this article adds to the current debate on institutional transformation 
by demonstrating the necessity of detailed empirical analysis to our understanding of 
on- and off-path change. Subtle analysis allows us to gain insight into the ongoing 
processes of negotiation on authority in distinct social regimes, and the mediating 
role that institutions play in this. Importantly, as we have tried to show, such analysis 
also helps to unpack the more unexpected and unpredictable transformations in a 
social policy regime.  In general, our analysis of institutional change in complex policy 
systems such as health care stresses the need to study the interaction between 
aspects of the political context, the properties of institutions and the process of 
negotiation and renegotiation between the actors involved. All are crucially important 
to the understanding of institutional transformation. Especially in a critical case such 
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as the self-governance of medical doctors and their accompanying authority claims 
over their medical training regimes. 
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